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Introduction
Most studies in the empirical literature find a negative relationship between
diversification and performance, either measured by profitability, productivity or stock
market returns1. Product and capital markets discipline is often invoked to correct or
even eradicate the source of this allocative inefficiency.
Empirical evidence from the US in the late 80s and early 90s is consistent with the
hypothesis that, as competition gets tougher and capital markets become more efficient,
firms reduce diversification and abandon marginal and less profitable activities2.
According to ex-ante expectations of the benefits of the Single European Market,
one of the effects of the increased competitive pressure within an integrated economy is
to drive firms to reduce the extent of their product diversification and to refocus on their
core business3.
To date, the evidence of de-diversification in the European Union is uncertain.
Based on summary results of a research project on the changing structure of EU
manufacturing over the decade 1987-1997, we observe quite an undecided behaviour
amongst the largest EU leaders4. A heterogeneous pattern of diversification trends
emerges, in which some large firms first increase and then reduce diversification, some
decrease it monotonically and others even increase the number of their operations. In
particular, comparing data between 1987 and 1993, firms appeared to be somewhat in
disequilibrium at the onset of the Single Market, uncertain as to whether expand or
reduce the range of their activities5. Evidence for a later year, albeit revealing that
diversification has diminished on average, seems to suggest that the adjustment process
was not concluded in 1997 and that many firms (especially large ones) were still on the
path to converge to a new equilibrium. Clearly, further analysis is required to
understand the ultimate direction of corporate restructuring. Our analysis of the
changing pattern of diversification of EU leaders in manufacturing is relevant for
understanding whether European producers are moving toward a more efficient use of
their resources (intangible and proprietary assets, domestic competitive advantages).
                                                
1 Lang and Stulz (1994), Lichtenberg (1992), Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont and Polk (2001).
2 Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Markides (1995), Comment and Jarrel (1995).
3 Cecchini, Catinat and Jacquemin (1988), European Commission (1990, 1996).
4 KUL, UEA, CERIS, WIFO (2001), “Determinants of industrial concentration, market integration and
efficiency in the European Union”, Study for the DG Economic and Financial Affairs, April,
unpublished.
5 Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli (2001a).
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This paper addresses two main questions that are related with the motivations and
the effects of multi-product strategies, namely the extent and the purpose of
diversification. Our study departs from previous empirical research that documents
whether EU leaders have reduced diversification equating this to an unqualified “return
to core strategy”, in that it investigates if firms have de-diversified by increasing the
relatedness of their activities. Insofar as firms pursue strategies of “related constrained
diversification”, diversification builds around a core organisational capability. As a
consequence, firms may increase relatedness without reducing diversification. What the
economic and finance theories predict is that it is not just important that firms reduce
diversification, but that they re-adjust around one core business to draw the benefits
from narrow business strategies or objectives6. Empirical research in this field has
mainly focussed on the level and change of diversification, thus failing to account,
jointly, for the relatedness content of changing diversification strategies.
The mixed evidence for the EU to date may simply depend on the fact that
looking at reductions in diversification indexes alone might conceal that firms are
actually increasing relatedness and refocussing not around one core business, but
around more core businesses. As the notions of “core business” as well as of
“relatedness” are not clearly defined and different definitions may lead to different
conclusions, our main hypothesis – that EU largest firms have re-focussed around
related industries – is tested using alternative measures of “core” and “relatedness”.
We conduct our analysis with a large dataset comprised of more than 200 leading
manufacturing firms operating in the European Union. The data we use is the most
suitable in providing the answers to the questions above. The Market Share Matrix for
EU manufacturing leading firms in 1987, 1993 and 1997 is explicitly and purposively
designed to analyse and track the evolution of the industrial and corporate organisation
of the European Union, based upon firm-level data7. The database includes the estimates
of the turnovers of the top 5 EU leading producers in each three digit EU manufacturing
industry disaggregated across all the industries and member states in which they
operate. It provides a time-consistent comparison at a comprehensive and analytical
level for the decade alongside the ongoing integration process (1987-1997).
                                                
6 See Rotemberg and Saloner (1994), Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), Jensen (1986), Rumelt
(1982).
7 The database is the by-product of an ongoing collaborative international project financed by the
European Commission, which started in the early Nineties. The main results are summarised in
Davies, Lyons et al. (1996), Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli (2001), KUL, UEA, CERIS, WIFO,
(2001).
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Our results suggest that, in spite of limited evidence of reduction in the levels of
conventional indexes of diversification, firms appear to have pursued strategies of
related constrained diversification.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 describes the measures of diversification
and relatedness we use in the empirical analysis and presents our research strategy.
Section 4 describes the data and presents the summary statistics. Section 5 presents the
empirical methods that we employ to test our hypotheses and the econometric results.
Section 6 concludes.
2.
 
Literature
Mainstream economics argues in favour of diversification when it prescribes that
profit maximising firms should not forgo profitable opportunities, and even unprofitable
ones, if financial markets are not perfect and bankruptcy is costly. In the field of
strategic management, narrow strategies and “clearly defined” goals are instead praised.
Plausible motivations to pursue focussed strategies are that there are increasing returns
to specialisation and that narrow objectives facilitate coordination.
In between these two extremes, many arguments have been made about why firms
diversify: scale and scope economies, intangible and proprietary assets, managerial
hubris, risk diversification, multimarket contacts8. In the early literature, the interest of
economists in diversification stemmed from its potential anti-competitive effects
(Edwards, 1955). According to the market-power view, diversified firms may behave
anticompetitively in various ways: cross-subsidisation (when profits in one industry can
be used to sustain predatory pricing in another market where competition is tougher);
mutual forbearance (where firms meeting each others in several industries have a
greater incentive to devise and sustain collusive agreements. See Bernheim and
Whinston, 1990), reciprocal buying (whenever the multiple interrelationships among
large conglomerates foreclose markets to smaller competitors).
The resource view of diversification argues that, in the growth process, firms
accumulate resources that can be profitably employed to enter new related markets if
transaction costs make it costly to sell the services of such resources through the market
mechanism (Penrose, 1959, Rubin, 1973, Teece, 1982). Noticeably, both the market-
power and the resource views are consistent with profit maximisation, but only the latter
is consistent with the efficient use of resources. Conversely, according to the agency
                                                
8 For recent surveys of the theories of diversification, see Montgomery (1994) and Vannoni (2000).
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(managerial) view of diversification, managers pursue their own objectives (private
benefits deriving from empire-building and risk diversification) in conflict with
shareholders’ interests for profit maximisation (Marris, 1964), and over-invest in
growth projects that reduce the firm’s value (Jensen, 1986). A side effect of the positive
relationship between size and product diversification is that large corporations are most
likely to exhibit a considerable amount of unrelated and industrially illogic
diversification. However, this “golf-course” diversification is bound to be eliminated as
soon as competition in the core industry toughens.
From a different perspective, Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter (1994) propose a
theory which encompasses elements of the resource view of diversification and of
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The firm’s choice of an optimal
strategy (i.e coherent diversification versus specialisation or unrelated diversification)
depends on a set of firm-specific factors – e.g. the firm’s technological and
organisational capabilities – as well as on a set of characteristics of the “selection
environment”. The theory predicts that if the competitive pressure in the selection
environment becomes tougher, the firm ought to re-focus to ensure survival.
Both the managerial view and the approach by Teece et al (1994) converge in
predicting that important changes in the competitiveness of markets, such as those
driven by globalisation at the world level or by European integration at a more regional
level, push firms towards related diversification strategies. In the empirical literature,
descriptive and anecdotal evidence is consistent with such interpretation of the changes
in diversification patterns. Markides (1995), for example, finds that, in contrast with the
diversification waves of the 60’s and the 70’s, his large sample of Fortune firms turned
towards more focused strategies in the 80’s. Firms were exiting marginal and unrelated
activities, probably as a result of increased stock markets’ efficiency in assessing and
rewarding firms’ strategies, or because of improved managerial ability to rule
organisations. Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli (2001) examine the impact of the Single
European Market on diversification strategies of EU leaders in the period 1987-1993.
They show that ‘return to the core’ had been marginal on average (but stronger for firms
active in industries judged as more ‘sensitive’ to European Integration) and that de-
diversification was confined to non-leading activities (see also Sembenelli, 1999).
However, this evidence is based on changes in diversification levels, and does not
take into account the changes in the type of diversification (i.e. from unrelated to
related). A step in this direction is the study by Fan and Lang (2000), who constructed
measures of vertical relatedness and complementarity of diversification strategies. Their
main results for a large panel of US firms in the period 1979-1997 show that, while the
level of diversification was decreasing, relatedness was increasing over time on both
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 8/2002
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dimensions. In their analysis vertical relatedness and complementarity are calculated
with respect to the firm’s primary activity, which is assumed to be the ‘core business’ of
the firm. Similar to Fan and Lang (2000), we analyse the changing pattern of
diversification strategies of EU leaders in the 1987-1997 period by considering, jointly
with indexes of the degree of diversification, alternative measures of relatedness. We
depart from this approach, however, in that we investigate the return to the core
business of EU leaders by using a number of different definitions of “core business”,
including the principal 3-digit industry, the principal 2-digit industry and the set of most
related industries.
3.
 
Empirical measures of diversification and relatedness
3.1 Definitions and drawbacks of diversification indexes
There are several commonly used indices to measure firms’ product (and
geographical) diversification, each requiring different degrees of disaggregation and
analytical detail in the data. These range from the number of industries in which the
firm operates or the output share in the primary industry, which are relatively easier to
construct, to the Entropy index, which instead requires detailed information on the
breakdown of the firm’s output into the various industries. A related issue, with obvious
implications for the resulting levels of diversification, is the definition of the industries,
although the choice of the degree of disaggregation is often dictated by reasons of
practicality.
The analytical detail in our dataset enables us to use the most information-
intensive index, the Entropy (E) and to compare their results with a less refined, albeit
telling, measure of the share of output in non-primary industries to total output.
More precisely, for firm i, diversification is defined as:
Ei = - Σ sj ln sj                                      (1)
where sj is the firm’s output (defined by sales) share in industry j and the summation is
across industries (j), and
Ri = Σ s-p                          (2)
where s
-p  is the firm’s output share outside the primary (i.e largest) industry. Thus a
firm is specialised in a single industry (non-diversified) if it records Ei = 1*0 = 0 and
Ri = 1 –1 = 0. In contrast, a firm spreading its output equally across k industries records:
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 8/2002
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Ei = - Σ (1/k)*ln(1/k) = ln k and Ri = 1 – (1/k). To facilitate the interpretation of the
Entropy index, we use its number equivalent form, which re-defines diversification as if
the firm is operating equally across industries9. The number equivalent form is:
NEi = antilog (Ei)         (3)
The main difference between the Entropy index and alternative measures, such as
the Berry index (Bi = 1-Σ sj2) is that it does attach less weight to those operations which
account for a larger proportion of the firm’s activities.  Consequently, for a firm
distributing its operations unequally across industries, the actual number of industries is
greater than the number equivalent of its entropy index (NE), and this, in turn, is greater
than the number equivalent of the Berry index (NBi =1/(1-Bi)).
One major drawback of diversification indexes is that they only account for the
quantitative and distributive dimensions of diversification (the number of industries, the
distribution of the output shares). They do not capture the qualitative dimension of
multi-product strategies, i.e. the extent to which the different activities are related to
each other and to the core business. As a consequence, the reduction in diversification is
not easily interpreted. For example, what is the underlying strategy of a firm that
appears to be de-diversifying? Which industries is it abandoning, and why? One
plausible strategy, consistent with the ex-ante expectations of the effects of the Single
Market, is that firms reduce diversification by abandoning marginal industries and by
focussing around a “core business”, i.e. expanding the output of industries related to the
“core”. Although the conventional notion of a multi-product firm is that there exists one
primary activity, anecdotal evidence shows that large corporations often have more than
one core business. In so far as diversification indexes fail to reflect this important
feature of the corporate structure, comparing indexes through time may not reveal the
most relevant changes.
3.2 Research strategy
As the definitions of “relatedness” and of “core business” appear themselves
disputable, our research strategy consists in testing for alternative measures of
relatedness and core. We start with a notion of relatedness that defines related all three
digit industries within one single two digit industry. The core is therefore a two digit
industry where the firm has several three digit operations. One novelty of this approach
                                                
9 Conceptually, the number equivalent form identifies the number of hypothetical equal-sized output
shares that would be required to generate the original diversification index, see also Davies & Lyons,
1996, Appendix 1.
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is that the firm is in principle allowed to have more than one core business. However, it
is implicitly assumed that only activities classified in the same 2-digit industry are
related. Statistical offices cluster industries according to both technological
characteristics of the production process and broad marketing similarities (e.g. vehicles
and parts, chemical and pharmaceuticals, foods and beverages). Vertical integration is
an obvious dimension of relatedness that this definition fails to capture, in spite of the
fact that vertical links can explain why firms keep operating in different 2 digit
industries10. Complementarity between industries sharing similar input and/or output
markets is another unaccounted dimension11. For example, tin cans and glass and plastic
containers share common output markets, i.e. the food and beverage industry.
Pharmaceuticals and soap and detergents both use basic chemicals as intermediate
products.
To account for the potential disadvantages of measures of relatedness and cores
based on two digit industries, we adopt an alternative approach, that builds on the
methodology introduced by Fan and Lang (2000). Exploiting the information available
in the Italian Input-Output Tables for 1992, we construct two measures of relatedness
between pairs of sectors, one for vertical relatedness and one for complementarity. The
tables record for each sector j (92 sectors in total, of which 54 are manufacturing) the
amount of inputs transferred to industry s (xjs). The input and output coefficients are
respectively ajs=xjs/Xs and bjs=xjs/Xj, where Xs (Xj) is the total output produced by
industry s (j). High values of ajs (bjs) reveal that industry s (j) has important backward
(forward) integration relationships with industry j (s). A similar interpretation applies
for asj and bsj12.
An index of average vertical relatedness between industry j and s can be
constructed by looking at their respective average backward and forward relationships13:
Vjs = (ajs+asj+bjs+bsj)/414.
                                                
10 See for example the following vertical productive chains: metal products-rubber-electrical goods-
motor vehicles; electrical and electronic products-office equipment.
11
 As highlighted by Fan and Lang (2000), the definition of complementarity is broader than “horizontal
integration” in that the former may cover different industries, whereas the latter is confined within the
same industry.
12 Note that even if industry j is an important input supplier for industry s, not necessarily s is an
important destination industry for industry j. For example plastic products are very important inputs
for the beverages industry, but the latter is not a very important destination industry for plastic
manufacturers. To take another example, car manufacturing is the most important forward industry for
manufacturers of tyres, but the tyres industry is not a very important backward industry for car
manufacturers.
13 For another example of how input-output tables can be used to infer measures of vertical integration,
see Davies and Morris (1995).
14 In this we depart from Fan and Lang (2000).  By using the index VB=(ajs+asj)/2 they are de facto
exploring only the backward relationship between industries j and s.
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An index of average complementarity between industries j and s can be
constructed by looking at the similarity in their relationships with other industries as
input providers or as output buyers. Starting from the inputs coefficient matrix (ajs as
elements of the matrix) and the output coefficients matrix (bjs as elements of the
matrix), we compute:
Cjs = ½ ·[corr(akj,aks)+corr(bjk,bsk)], for all k different from j and s.
In practice, corr(akj,aks) is the correlation between the column j and the column s
of the inputs coefficient matrix, measuring if the two industries have similar inputs
flows; analogously, corr(bjk,bsk) is the correlation between rows j and s of the output
coefficients matrix, measuring if the two industries are similar in their output flows to
the other k industries.
After having calculated Vjs and Cjs for each pair of industries, we check if firms in
our sample operate into a set of vertically related and/or complementary sectors. This is
done in different ways. First, we compute the relatedness between each industry in
which the firm operates and its principal three digit industry (C3jp and V3jp), under the
assumption that the core business is the firm’s main 3-digit activity. Second, we
compute the average relatedness between industry j and all the other industries
classified in the firm’s largest 2 digit industry (C2jp and V2jp), assuming that the core
business of the firm corresponds to its main 2 digit industry. In section 4 we present
descriptive statistics of the changing diversification patterns of EU leaders based on
vertical relatedness and complementarity.
In section 5 we use our two definitions of relatedness, one based on the three-digit
activities in the same two digit cluster, the other based on vertical relatedness and
complementarity to investigate for EU leaders if the increase in the output share
between 1987 and 1997 in industry j is positively related to a) the firm’s sales in 1987 in
the set of related sectors and b) the growth of sales in the set of related sectors.
4.
 
Data and descriptive statistics
In this section we present summary statistics on firm diversification for 1987 and
1997 based on the Matrix of Market Shares database. The basic idea of the database is
to identify a group of leading firms and disaggregate their turnover figures across the
NACE 3-digit manufacturing industries in which it operates. A firm qualifies as a
leader
 if it is one the five largest EU producers in at least one manufacturing industry.
For each firm the matrix reports the full extent of its diversification across industries
(not only includes those where it is a leader) as well as the full extent of intra EU
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 8/2002
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multinational production.  The database does not include the firm’s output produced
outside the EU, but non-EU multinationals that qualify as a top 5 leader in any industry
are included15.
A comparison of the basic dimensions of the matrices for 1987 and 1997 provides
a quick guide to the major changes in firm diversification over this period (Table 1a).
By construction the number and identities of industries remain unchanged, but the
number and identities of firms may well differ.  In what follows, however, we abstract
from firms’ identities and present two highly stylised facts:
I. The number of firms, 223, remained substantially unchanged. However, the
number of multi-product firms decreased by five units from 1987 to 1997.
II. The number of entries (the non-zero cells in the matrices, denoting the breakdown
of firm output across industries) has remarkably decreased (from 1079 to 810, 25
percentage points), providing the first evidence of decline in diversification. As
the number of leading entries is constant by construction (67 industries x 5
leading positions = 335), this fall is exclusively accounted for by non-leading
entries - from 744 in 1987 to 475 in 1997. This pattern is confirmed by the drop in
the average number of entries (from 4.84 to 3.63), that again is due exclusively to
the reduction in non-leading diversification (from 3.34 to 2.13). Altogether, the
evidence suggests that EU firms have reduced their diversification at the expense
of industries in which they are not leaders.
In table 1b we separate firms that have survived in the matrix as leaders in at least
one industry, from firms that either exited from or entered into the matrix between 1987
and 1997. Of the 223 initial leaders, 123 maintained a leadership position in 1997. In
that we expect that the increasing competitive pressure favoured less diversified firms
more than high diversifiers, we should find that entrants (i.e. new leaders) are less
diversified than exitors, and survivors exhibit lower, or decreasing, diversification over
the period. Overall, the empirical findings are consistent with the return to the core
hypothesis. On the one hand, exitors (100 firms) were, on average, highly diversified
and more diversified than the new leaders (100 entrants). On the other hand, surviving
leaders (123 firms) exhibit relatively high diversification, which they reduced by the
end of the period, albeit marginally. Not surprisingly, however, surviving leaders appear
                                                
15 The original 1987 Matrix used the NACE classification Rev-0, but the 1997 Matrix had to be
constructed using the new NACE Rev-1 classification, to ensure comparability with EUROSTAT
industry data. Comparable firm data became available thanks to a major reclassification of the
industry set (from 96 NACE-Rev 0 industries to 67 “sectors”, in an effort to match the old and the
new classifications), and of the country set (from 12 EC member states to 15 EU countries). See
Davies and Lyons (1996) and KUL, UEA, CERIS and WIFO (2001).
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to be the largest in the sample. As the positive correlation between diversification and
firm size is a stylised fact in the empirical literature, a relatively higher degree of
diversification is therefore to be expected.
4.1 Distribution of diversification across firms
In Tables 2a and 2b we report summary statistics on 2-digit and 3-digit
diversification indices16.
The two tables present the distributions of diversification indices across firms, by
comparing the quartiles and extreme deciles of the distributions of NE (the Number
equivalent of Entropy) and R (the output share in secondary industries), when firms are
ranked by diversification.  The changes in means calculated for 2-digit industries (Table
2a) appear to be consistent with a de-diversification process. EU leaders appear to have,
on average, operations in 1.88 2-digit sectors in 1997, as opposed to 1.72 in 1987. Firms
in the top decile of the distribution were operating in 3.16 2-digit industries in 1987, and
in 2.80 ten years later. Looking through the indices in Table 2a, we find that highly
diversified firms decreased diversification more substantially. At this level of
aggregation, these preliminary findings are suggestive of rationalisations that eliminated
operations in unrelated or marginal industries.
Turning to Table 2b we find that the evidence of de-diversification is only
particularly pronounced when the Entropy index is used, thus suggesting that firms
prevailingly retreated from marginal industries. Inspection of the R index reveals that
the output share in secondary industries, on average, increased by 1 percentage point
over the decade. Looking at the distributions of 3-digit indices we find that, throughout
the period, the mean values of the index are overall remarkably stable. The only
exception is that firms in the top decile (i.e. the most diversified firms) have increased
their output shares in non-primary industries by 5 percentage points. Coupled with a
decrease of the Entropy index, this suggests a reshuffling of output shares aimed at
retreating from marginal activities (or at increasing in other, non-primary industries).
The finding that, in spite of a decrease in the Entropy, output shares in secondary
three digit industries increased by 1%, leads us to inspecting the dynamics of output
shares. Table 2c shows summary statistics of the output shares (OS) ranked by size for
the sub-sample of surviving firms that are diversified in one or both years (108 out of
123 firms). OS I (II, III) industry is therefore the output share in the primary (secondary,
third) 2- or 3-digit industry. The table reveals that, on average, the firms’ turnovers are
                                                
16 The original 67 industries, roughly corresponding to a 3 digit classification, have been grouped into 19
macro aggregates, roughly corresponding to a 2 digit classification.
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highly concentrated in their primary industry, at both levels of disaggregation. The
largest three-digit industry accounts for more than two thirds of the output, whereas the
third industry ranked by size has an average output share of less than 10%. Comparing
2- and 3- digit results across time, however, we find a pattern consistent with the idea of
refocussing and rebalancing of output shares.  On the one hand, the primary 3-digit
industry loses ground in favour of the industries that rank second (+1.8 percentage
points) and third (+0.6), whereas the remaining marginal sectors reduce their shares by
nearly 2 percentage points. On the other hand, the output share in the primary 2-digit
industry increases by 1.5 points and, added up to the slightly increasing share in the
secondary industry, amounts to 94.7% of the total output at the end of the period.
In general, the overall impression of a remarkable return to the core is somewhat
weakened by these findings. Firms appear to have readjusted their corporate structure
around a lower number of industries, but have not re-focussed the output share in their
primary industry in any remarkable way.  In other words, instead of a return to core
business, we are documenting either a return to core businesses or a re-focussing on
interrelated 3-digit industries. Looking at the results of table 2c, we note that the
primary 2-digit industry can be a plausible proxy for a cluster of “core” of related
industries.
4.2 The new indexes, C3i, V3i, C2i, V2i
Following our research strategy, we now turn to investigate if firms operate in a
set of sectors related to their main 3 digit or 2 digit activity. C3i=ΣjC3jp·xj
(V3i=ΣjV3jp·xj) is a weighted average (with weights xj=Sij/(Si-Sp3) being the output
shares of industries j, excluding the primary 3 digit industry Sp3) for firm i of the
complementarity (vertical relatedness) between each sector j and the firm’s primary 3
digit industry. Analogously, C2i=ΣjC2jp·sj (V2i=ΣjV2jp·sj) is a weighted average for firm
i of the complementarity (vertical relatedness) between each sector j and all the
activities classified in the firm’s primary 2 digit industry17.
Table 3a shows that complementarity with respect to both the primary 3-digit
industry and the primary 2-digit industry has increased in the period, while the values of
vertical relatedness have remained fairly stable. Compared to the average values of Cjs
and Vjs in the Italian input output matrix, respectively 0.215 (maximum value = 1) and
0.0087 (maximum value = 0.2842), Table 3a reports much higher values for our data.
                                                
17 C2jp and V2 jp are in turn weighted averages of the relatedness between industry j and all the other
industries belonging to the firm’s main two digit activity: C2jp=ΣjCjp·yj (V2jp=ΣjVjp·yj), for all j’s
included in the primary two digit industry, where weights are yj=Sij/Sp2.
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This suggests that the EU leaders in our sample are diversified into industries which
have remarkable links with the main 3 digit industry and with the largest 2 digit cluster.
Moreover, by looking at the leading positions only (i.e. at all the j’s in which the firm is
a top 5 leader) we notice higher values for both complementarity and vertical
relatedness. This suggests that relatedness with respect to the firm’s main 3 digit or 2
digit industry is important for firms to reach or maintain leadership positions.
Table 3b, which reports average values of C3jp, V3jp, C2jp and V2jp for 676
firm/industry observations (i.e. excluding each firm’s primary industry), records for all
the indices lower values as compared to C3i, V3i, C2i, V2i reported in Table 3a. Since
the latter are simple averages (across all firms) of firm-level weighted averages, this
implies that the industries with the highest output share are more related to the firm’s
primary 3-digit (2-digit) industry than the industries accounting for a small portion of
the firm’s output.
The second and third columns of Table 3b refer to the behaviour of entries and
exits. The higher values in the third column of C3jp and C2jp suggest that, on average,
firms entered industries which were complementary with respect to the primary 3-digit
or 2-digit industry, and exited industries which were less related. The evidence for
vertical relatedness is much weaker.
To summarise, the descriptive statistics show that complementarity between a
firm’s set of industries and its main 3 digit or 2 digit industry is high and increasing
through time for our sample of firms. Conversely, the pattern for vertical relatedness is
less clearly discernible (see also section 5).
In the next section we include C3jp, V3jp, C2jp, and V2jp as explanatory variables
in our econometric analysis. In addition we use the Cjs and Vjs variables obtained from
the Input-Output tables to investigate if aggregating forces other than the primary 3 digit
(2-digit) industry drive the restructuring/reorganization of diversification towards more
related patterns.
5.
 
Econometric evidence
5.1 An Empirical Model of Output Share Growth
To perform our analysis of “return to core business” amongst EU leaders in a
period of market integration, we investigate the determinants of changes in firm output
shares over the decade 1987-1997. The motivation of our choice of change in output
share as the dependent variable is twofold. First, the joint analysis of diversification
indices (Entropy and R index) has shown that the readjustment within the firm is mainly
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reflected in a reshuffling of its output shares. If the firm is refocussing around a set of
related industries, marginal activities (small output shares) are abandoned (the output
share decreases or goes to zero), and vice-versa. We study what drives this reshuffling.
Second, the use of output share changes allows us to adopt a simple, but flexible
empirical model of the growth of the firm (see Davies and Geroski, 1997). The starting
point is the Gibrat’s model of the dynamics of firm size, which postulates that firm
growth rates are random and, therefore, that firm size follows a random walk. We adjust
this conceptual framework to describe the growth of each industry (as measured by
output shares) within the firms instead of the growth of firm size (as measured by
market shares) within the industry. As output shares are bounded between zero and one,
the simplest stochastic description of output shares growth is that they follow a random
walk with regression to the mean. Therefore we write ∆OSij = α + λ OSij + µij, where
OSij =  Sij / Si is firm’s i output share in industry j at time t-1 (1987), Sij is the firm’s
output in industry j and Si is the firm’s total output.  If there is regression to the mean, λ
is less than zero. This model can be easily extended to include a vector of firm and
industry explanatory variables, Xij. We then interact the firm’s initial output shares at
time t with the set of explanatory variables, thus allowing the parameters α and λ to
vary across firms and industries (the industries in which the firm is operating in either
one or both years). By interacting the initial output share with firm/industry specific
variables, we investigate which variable is either making the regression to the mean less
pronounced, or even driving the output share away from the regression to the mean.
The final specification for the econometric investigation is therefore:
∆OSij = a + b OSij + c Xij + d Xij*OSij+ µij
The original dataset is therefore rearranged to form an unbalanced panel where the
two dimensions are N firms and I industries. By using the whole set of output shares for
each surviving firm in 1987 and 1997, we fully exploit the informational content of the
database. We present the econometric results of pooled regressions where the standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
The empirical tests in this paper focus principally on the hypothesis that de-
diversification among EU leaders has mainly occurred by re-focussing production
around a core of related activities. We therefore include a specifically constructed
variable designed to measure the extent to which each individual industry is related to a
core of “related industries” in each firm.  The remaining firm- or industry-specific
variables are included mainly for control purposes, although they also contribute
explaining what drives output shares’ changes.  Here follows the list of control variables
and their definition.
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As firm specific variables we include LFIRMSIZE87, the firm’s size, measured
by the log of total sales in 1987, and DIV87, firm i’s diversification index measured by
the Number Equivalent of Entropy in 1987.
We then add three firm/industry specific variables. LEADER87 is a dummy
variable that identifies if firm i was amongst the five 1987 EU leaders in industry j.
ENTRY is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if firm i became an EU leader in 1997,
in industry j.  EXIT is a dummy variable, 1 if firm i was no longer a leader in 1997, in
industry j.
Finally, we include an industry specific variable, designed to identify the set of
industries that were supposed to be most affected by the implementation of the Single
Market Programme, i.e. the so-called sensitive industries (Buigues, Ilzkovitz and
Lebrun, 1990). We define SENSITIVE a dummy variable that is 1 if j is a SMP
sensitive industry.
Our primary interest is for the variables designed either to capture relatedness or
to measure the core. To account for the multifaceted notion of “relatedness” and of
“core business”, our research strategy consists in testing for alternative measures and
alternative specifications. Insofar as industries that are related to a “core”, however
measured, grow faster than industries that are not related to the “core”, the firm is
pursuing a strategy of related constrained diversification.  In Section 3 we described
three alternative measures of relatedness, one simply based on the two-digit industry
that includes the three-digit industry j, the other two based on average vertical
relatedness and complementarity between industry j and the other industries in the
product mix of the diversified firm i.  C3jp measures the complementarity between
industry j and firm i’s primary industry. V3jp measures the vertical relatedness between
industry j and firm i’s primary industry. Similarly, C2jp and V2jp measure the weighted
average vertical relatedness and complementarity between industry j and the remaining
industries in the same 2-digit aggregate. A positive relationship between the output
share change and C3jp and V3jp (C2jp and V2jp) suggests that relatedness matters in
driving the reshuffling of output shares and that the primary three-digit (two-digit)
industry can be a plausible measure of the “core”.
To operationalize other measures of relatedness, we construct two firm specific
variables, i.e. one level (size) and one growth variable for the “core”. The former adds
up, for each firm, either the individual output shares in each two-digit industry or the
output shares of all industries with vertical relatedness (Vjs) and complementarity (Cjs)
above the sample medians18. The latter is the relative growth of either the firm’s 2-digit
                                                
18 The sample medians are 0.001 for V3js and 0.13 for C3js.
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industry or the firm’s cluster of vertically related or complementary industries with
respect to total firm growth, excluding industry j. In order to reduce reverse causality
problems, both level and growth variables are computed excluding industry j.
To summarise, SHA2D87-j is firm i’s output share in j’s 2-digit industry,
excluding OSij; and GROWTH2D-j is the relative growth rate of j’s 2-digit industry
with respect to total firm growth, excluding industry j.  Likewise, SHACOMjs (and,
analogously, SHAVERTjs) is firm i’s output share in the set of highly complementary
(most vertically related) industries, and GROWCOMjs (GROWVERTjs) is the relative
growth rate of j’s most related industries with respect to total firm growth (excluding
industry j). By including these variables we investigate the impact of clusters of related
industries on industry j’s growth.
5.2 Econometric Results
We start with a simple specification that tests for the impact of the “Input-Output”
relatedness variables, C3jp and V3jp, on the changes of industry j’s output shares, ∆OSij
between 1987 and 1997. The data sample is comprised of the sample of surviving
diversified firms in one or both years, i.e. 108 firms, but drops the primary industry’s
observation since C3jp and V3jp capture the relatedness of industry j with the firm’s
primary activity. This leaves us with 676 firm/industry observations. Table 4
summarises the results. We first note that both the firm’s size and the initial output
share in industry j, OS87, enter with a negative coefficient, the latter confirming
regression to the mean. The extent of firm diversification in 1987 appears to display a
negative effect on relative industry growth, thus suggesting that highly diversified firms
may face some problems in allocating resources for growth, but the point estimate of the
coefficient is not significant. The firm/industry controls all enter significantly in the
equation, and their coefficients are signed quite consistently with common sense
explanations. Being a LEADER in 1987 has a positive impact on the output share
change, as might be expected if the firm intends to maintain the leadership.  Similarly,
becoming a leader (ENTRY) or losing a top position (EXIT) display, respectively, a
positive and a negative effect on the relative growth of the industry.  Indeed, we add
these controls to avoid that the inclusion of turnover in leadership positions might
unduly bias (emphasize) the effect of our relatedness variables. SENSITIVE enters the
equation with a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that, for EU leaders,
operating in industries that were expected to be more affected by the Single Market
leads to higher growth rates. Turning to the relatedness variables, we find that when we
include both V3jp and C3jp (column (i)) only complementarity exhibits a positive and
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significant coefficient. This suggests that the higher the similarity in the input factors
and output markets relationships between the industry and the firm’s primary activity,
the higher the change in industry j’s output shares. The result in column (ii), where C3jp
appears alone confirms the positive, growth-enhancing role of complementarity.
Vertical relatedness is still not significant in column (iii), but investigating non-
linearities we find an inverted-U quadratic relationship between V3jp and industry
growth (column (iv)). Vertical links have a positive impact on the industry’s growth, but
only up to a certain threshold, beyond which it is plausible to presume that some firms
may decide to de-verticalize19. This result bears some empirical relevance as to the long-
standing issue in industrial organization that concerns the determinants of the
boundaries of the firms, and certainly deserves further research20. In a set of unreported
regressions we tested for the impact of C2jp and V2jp, obtaining results very similar to
those shown in Table 4.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 report the results of models where the output shares of the
cluster of related industries, and their relative growth rates, are included as explanatory
variables. These variables are further interacted with the initial (1987) output share in
each industry to explore their impact on regression to mean.
We start with the results from the model reported in Table 5, that adds SHA2D87-
j, the total output share in the 2-digit industry, to the control variables discussed above.
The data sample includes all firm/industry observations for the sub-sample of surviving
firms that were diversified in either 1987 or 1997 (108 firms, 784 observations).
Column (i) reports the results of a specification excluding firm/industries controls and
interacted variables. The initial output share, OS87, exhibits the usual negative and
significant coefficient that denotes regression to the mean.  The coefficients for the
control variables have the same signs as those in Table 4, but are somewhat less
significant. Our primary interest is for the output share of 2-digit industries, i.e. the
core’s size, and its relative growth rate.  Both enter with positive and significant
coefficients (although the coefficient for the level variable SHA2D87-j is only
significant at the 10% level), indicating that the larger the initial output share of the
subset of related industries, and the higher its growth rate, the higher the industry
growth. This highlights the role of clusters of related activities in driving the
refocussing of our sample of EU leaders. When we include the variables controlling for
the leadership turnover, LEADER87, ENTRY, and EXIT, all highly significant and
with the expected sign, we find that the coefficient on the 2-digit share loses
                                                
19 The threshold is for V3jp equal to 0.19, a fairly high value if compared with the maximum value
recorded for Vjs in the Input-Output Matrix, i.e. 0.284.
20 Interestingly, the inverse-U relationship does not hold for complementarity.
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significance, but not the coefficient on the growth rate, GROWTH2D-j (see column
(ii)). Column (iii) reports the result for the full specification, with all interactions, to
investigate what variables make the regression to the mean of the 1987 output share less
pronounced. Of the control variables that appear interactively with OS87, all enter the
equation significantly and keep their signs, except LEADER87. This suggests, not
surprisingly, that regression to the mean is less acute for industries in which firms
become a leader over the period and more pronounced in those industries where they
lost the leading position during the decade. Analogously, regression to the mean is less
acute in sensitive industries. Of the variables accounting for the size and the growth of
the “core”, neither the level of output share nor its interaction is significant, whereas the
growth variable is positive and significant in either form. This indicates that the larger
the initial output shares in industry j, the stronger the growth-enhancing effect of the
“core” as defined by the set of industries in the same 2-digit industry.
Table 6 expands the scope of our analysis by using two alternative definitions of
“core business”, one comprising only industries with vertical relatedness (Vjs) greater
than the sample median, the other comprising only industries with complementarity
(Cjs) greater than the sample median (see section 4).
Columns (i) and (ii) report the results of the specification that does not include the
interactions with the initial output share in industry j. Again the coefficient on OS87
denotes regression to the mean and the control variables exhibit coefficients similar to
those obtained in table 5. Turning to the variables that proxy for relatedness, however,
we find that the size of the “core”, as measured by the vertically related or
complementary industries (SHACOMjs and SHAVERTjs) both exhibit a negative sign
(although only SHACOMjs is significant at the 7% level). But when we look at the
impact of the growth variables, GROWCOMjs and GROWVERTjs we find, consistently
with the results in Table 5, that both exhibit positive and highly significant coefficients,
suggesting a strong growth-enhancing effect of the “core”. When we include the
interacted variables in column (iii) and (iv), none of the interactions are significant.  If
any, the evidence suggests a negative effect of the initial size of the “core”, and a
positive effect of the growth of the core defined by complementarity (GROWCOMjs). In
contrast, both GROWCOMjs and GROWVERTjs, included separately, remain
significant, displaying their strong positive effect on the industry growth.
In tables 4, 5 and 6 we considered separately three different definitions of “core”,
namely: i) the firm’s primary 3 digit (2 digit) industry; ii) the 2-digit industries in which
the firm operates; and iii) the clusters of vertically related or complementary industries.
While the results so far suggest that firms are growing in industries linked to a ‘core
business’, we have not yet performed a joint analysis of the three core measures.
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Table 7 refines our results by including V3jp and C3jp along with the sizes and the
growth rates of cores based on vertically relatedness and complementarity. This is the
most restrictive specification, since we add, as a separate variable, the index of
relatedness with the firm’s primary industry that the common sense would describe as
the activity most likely to aggregate (be related with) the other industries in the firm’s
product mix. Consistently with our empirical strategy in Table 4, we drop the
firm/industry observations in the primary industry and remain with 676 observations.
We find here many suggestive indications. First, column (i) reports the results for the
‘complementarity’ core and shows, quite surprisingly, that the coefficient for the
complementarity with the primary industry, C3jp, is positive but not significant. The size
of the core, both separately and interactively is also not significant. Most importantly,
however, both the separate and the interacted coefficients for the core’s growth are
positive and highly significant. This clearly indicates that, even controlling for
relatedness with the primary industry, the growth of “cores” of complementary
industries, via input and output markets, positively influences industry growth, actually
contrasting regression to the mean. Second, the same effect does not appear to be at
work when vertical relatedness is examined. In column (ii) the aggregating force
appears to be the primary industry – V3jp enters with a positive and significant (the p-
value is 0.07) sign. The growth of the vertically related core influences the industry
growth directly, as in Table 6, but not interactively (the coefficient is negative, but not
statistically significant). Third, when we include C3jp and V3jp in the specification with
the ‘2-digit core’, only the former enters positively and significantly, but then both the
size and the growth of the 2-digit “core” lose their effect (columns (iii) and (iv)). Only
the positive coefficient on the separate growth variable (GROW2D-j) remains (weakly)
significant after the inclusion of C3jp and V3jp (p-values are 0.12 and 0.13 respectively).
In a set of unreported regressions we included C2jp and V2jp, industry j’s relatedness
with the primary 2-digit industry. The results show that neither C2jp nor V2jp enter
significantly in the equation, but the coefficients on both the growth “core” variable and
its interaction with OSij are positive and significant, consistently with our results in
Table 5. It should be noted, however, that the data sample for the regressions with C2jp
and V2jp included the firms’ observations for the primary three-digit industry (784
firm/industry observations). We interpret these findings as evidence of the aggregating
force of the 2-digit “core” that includes the primary 3-digit21.
                                                
21 For all estimated models, we tested the robustness of our results by estimating panel regressions with
one-way effects and robust standard errors. Overall our findings were found to be robust to this
change in estimating techniques.
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6.
 
Conclusions
According to ex-ante expectations of the benefits of the Single European Market,
one of the effects of the increased competitive pressure within the EU on corporate
structure was to drive firms to reduce the extent of their product diversification and
refocus on their core business. Evidence of the return to the core business for European
firms based on the most commonly used diversification indices is unclear. One
drawback of diversification indexes is that they do not capture the qualitative dimension
of multi-product strategies, i.e. the extent to which different activities are related to each
other and to the core business. Empirical research in this field usually equates the
reduction in diversification to an unqualified “return to core strategy”, thus neglecting
the relatedness content of changing diversification patterns.
This paper departs from previous studies by investigating if firms have de-
diversified by increasing the relatedness of their activities. As relatedness and core
business are not uniquely defined, our research strategy consists in testing for the
impact of different measures of relatedness and core. One is simply based on the two-
digit industry that includes a given three-digit industry j. To construct the other two
measures, one for vertical relatedness, one for complementarity (similarity between the
input and output markets), we exploit the information available in Input-Output Tables
(see Fan and Lang, 2000). We define accordingly the core of industry j as the set of
industries recording vertical relatedness or complementarity indexes above the sample
medians. We apply these definitions to firm level data included in the Market Shares
Matrix for EU manufacturing leaders in 1987 and in 1997. This unique database reports
for each EU leader the breakdown of its output across 3-digit manufacturing industries.
We then use the firm’s output shares (the share of the firm’s total output accounted for
by each industry) to construct alternative measures of “core” sizes by adding up, for
each firm, the output shares in industries that: i) belong to a given 2-digit industry, ii)
record vertical relatedness indexes, or iii) complementarity indexes above the sample
medians. Similarly, we construct three additional measures of the relative growth of the
cores (with respect to the firm’s growth). We finally use the size and the relative growth
rates of the “cores” as well as indexes of the vertical relatedness or complementarity
between industry j and the firm’s primary industry as explanatory variables in a model
of output share growth (see Davies and Geroski, 1997). The choice of output share
change as dependent variable is motivated by our descriptive analysis that shows that
the readjustment within the firm is mainly reflected in a reshuffling of output shares.
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We estimate a set of specifications including, alternatively or jointly, our
measures of cores and relatedness. We use different data samples, either including or
excluding the observations for the primary three-digit industry.
Our main results may be summarised as follows.
i. The 3-digit industry where the firm produces the largest share of its output (the
primary 3-digit industry) represents an aggregating “inner core” that drives the
relative growth of related industries. In fact we find that the higher the
complementarity with the primary 3-digit industry the higher the industry’s output
share change.
ii. Our results from the specification with the industry’s 2-digit “core” refines the
above findings indicating that the 2-digit industry represents itself a “broader
core” with an aggregating force, but only if it includes the primary 3-digit
industry. Diversified activities build around a core that is bounded by the 2-digit
definition.
iii. When we drop the firm’s primary 3-digit industry and control for the driving force
of the “inner 3-digit core”, we find that also non-primary industries tend to build
around cores of complementary industries.
Our results have interesting implications for the understanding of the readjustment
of European leaders’ corporate structures in the years of EU market integration. They
suggest that, in spite of limited evidence of de-diversification (as measured by
conventional indices) firms pursued strategies of related constrained diversification. On
the one hand we find evidence that refocussing has occurred and that the reshuffling of
output shares mainly reflects the growth of industries related to the firm’s primary (3-
digit) industry. On the other hand, we find that also remaining industries – i.e. those
unrelated to the primary 3-digit -, appear to be clustering based upon the similarity
between input and output markets (complementarity). In this respect our findings
support the view that European producers are moving toward a more efficient use of
their resources.
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Table 1a
Changes in the matrix between 1987, 1993 and 1997 aggregate EU figures
1987 1997
Number of Industries 67 67
Number of Firms 223 223
Number of Diversified Firms 175 170
Number of entries (non-zero cells) 1079 810
of which:
Leading 335 335
Non-leading 744 475
Number of entries per firm 4.84 3.63
of which:
Leading 1.50 1.50
Non-leading 3.34 2.13
Table 1b
Diversification of survivors, entrants and exitors
Arithmetic mean values of NE, R
Number equivalent
of Entropy
Output share in
secondary industriesN. Firms Size
1987 1997 1987 1997
Survivors 123 6147 2.67 2.45 0.28 0.29
Exitors 100 1502 2.57 - 0.27 -
Entrants 100 1859 - 2.03 - 0.22
Full Matrix Sample 223      - 2.62 2.25 0.27 0.25
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Table 2a
Distribution of diversification across surviving firms
(19 2-digit industries)
Number equivalent
of Entropy
Output share in secondary
industries
1987 1997 Change1997-87 1987 1997
Change
1997-87
Arithmetic mean values of D
Surviving Matrix Firms 1.88 1.72 -0.16 0.19 0.17 -0.01
Std. Dev. 0.95 0.89 -0.06 0.18 0.19 0.02
Distribution of D across firms
Decile 9 3.16 2.80 -0.36 0.46 0.50 0.04
Quartile 3 2.32 2.02 -0.30 0.34 0.30 -0.04
Median 1.60 1.38 -0.21 0.14 0.10 -0.04
Quartile 1 1.13 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.02
Decile 1 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2b
Distribution of diversification across surviving firms
(67 3-digit industries)
Number equivalent
of Entropy
Output share in secondary
industries
1987 1997 Change1997-87 1987 1997
Change
1997-87
Arithmetic mean values of D
Surviving Matrix Firms 2.67 2.45 -0.22 0.28 0.29 0.01
Std. Dev. 1.79 1.55 -0.24 0.22 0.24 0.02
Distribution of D across firms
Decile 9 4.79 4.56 -0.23 0.56 0.61 0.05
Quartile 3 3.42 3.07 -0.35 0.46 0.47 0.01
Median 2.15 1.97 -0.18 0.28 0.29 0.01
Quartile 1 1.36 1.17 -0.19 0.07 0.04 -0.03
Decile 1 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2c
Distribution of Output Shares, Ranked by Size. 108 Surviving Diversified Firms
(percentages, mean values). OSij =  Sij / Si
2-digit 3-digit
1987 1997 1987 1997
OS I Industry 79.6 81.1 68.0 67.4
OS II Industry 13.5 13.6 17.0 18.8
OS III Industry 4.2 3.4 6.7 7.3
OS in remaining industries 2.7 1.9 8.3 6.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 3a
Summary statistics of Vertical Relatedness and Complementarity
Firm averages (1)
1987 1997
Leading
positions in
1987
Leading
positions in
1997
No. Firms 101 96 101 96
Mean 0.485 0.509 0.539 0.532Complementarity with
Primary 3-digit (C3i) Std Dev 0.254 0.261 0.309 0.278
Mean 0.046 0.044 0.059 0.053Vertical relatedness with
Primary 3-digit (V3i) Std Dev 0.049 0.047 0.060 0.060
Mean 0.521 0.544 0.588 0.580Complementarity with
Primary 2-digit (C2i) Std Dev 0.244 0.256 0.291 0.275
Vertical relatedness with Mean 0.047 0.047 0.058 0.054
Primary 2-digit (V2i) Std Dev 0.046 0.043 0.055 0.053
Note 1: Primary industry excluded.
Table 3b
Summary statistics of Vertical Relatedness and Complementarity
Firm/industries averages (1). Relatedness of Exits and Entries
Total Exit fromTop 5
Entry in
Top 5
No. Firms / Industries 676 307 122
Mean 0.392 0.320 0.416Complementarity with Primary
3-digit (C3jp) Std Dev 0.278 0.248 0.279
Mean 0.027 0.019 0.021Vertical relatedness with Primary
3-digit (V3jp) Std Dev 0.044 0.035 0.035
Mean 0.413 0.335 0.413Complementarity with Primary
2-digit (C2
 jp) Std Dev 0.277 0.251 0.274
Vertical relatedness with Primary Mean 0.029 0.020 0.021
2-digit (V2
 jp) Std Dev 0.042 0.036 0.032
Note 1: Primary industry excluded.
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Table 4
Determinants of Output-Share Change (1987-1997)
Pooled Regressions
108 Firms, 676 Firm/Industry observations
Dependent Variable: ∆OSij
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
OS87 -0.272 -0.273 -0.269 -0.275
(-3.135) (-3.169) (-3.064) (-3.157)
C3
 jp 0.024 0.024 -- --
(1.881) (2.241) -- --
V3
 jp -0.003 -- 0.076 0.406
(-0.030) -- (0.978) (2.251)
V3
 jp Squared -- -- -- -2.111
-- -- -- (-1.973)
LEADER87 0.100 0.100 0.102 0.100
(5.251) (5.267) (5.296) (5.254)
ENTRY 0.126 0.126 0.128 0.130
(8.116) (8.103) (8.312) (8.407)
EXIT -0.145 -0.145 -0.145 -0.140
(-7.521) (-7.475) (-7.514) (-7.457)
SENSITIVE 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
(2.043) (2.052) (2.140) (2.065)
DIV87 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.113) (-1.110) (-1.330) (-1.247)
LFIRMSIZE87 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014
(-3.755) (-3.744) (-3.826) (-4.191)
Constant 0.100 0.100 0.112 0.119
(3.579) (3.568) (3.892) (4.163)
Adjusted R-squared 0.250 0.251 0.248 0.251
Notes: Results corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 5
Determinants of Output-Share Change (1987-1997)
Pooled Regressions
108 Firms, 784 Firm/Industry observations
Dependent Variable: ∆OSij
(i) (ii) (iii)
OS87     - 0.112       -0.203       -0.294
(-4.842) (-6.323) (-4.268)
SHA2D87-j         0.020 0.007 0.015
(1.860) (0.727) (1.389)
GROWTH2D-j        0.016        0.011         0.005
(3.984) (3.186) (1.668)
LEADER87 --        0.090        0.083
-- (4.745) (4.228)
ENTRY --        0.129       0.096
-- (7.906) (5.626)
EXIT --       -0.168       -0.097
-- (-6.967) (-3.827)
SENSITIVE 0.013        0.019 0.003
(1.601) (2.533) (0.479)
DIV87 -0.001 -0.002 --
(-0.914) (-1.590) --
LFIRMSIZE87 -0.004       -0.007       -0.012
(-1.173) (-1.989) (-3.494)
SHA2D87-j * OS87 -- -- -0.087
-- -- (-0.562)
GROWTH2D-j * OS87 -- --        0.047
-- -- (2.900)
LEADER87 * OS87 -- -- 0.073
-- -- (1.080)
ENTRY * OS87 -- --        0.463
-- -- (2.318)
EXIT * OS87 -- --          -0.387
-- -- (-2.395)
SENSITIVE * OS87 -- --        0.116
-- -- (2.739)
Constant         0.049        0.066       0.102
(1.734) (2.284) (3.517)
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.242 0.321
Notes: Results corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-statistics in parentheses.
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 8/2002
34
Table 6
Determinants of Output-Share Change (1987-1997)
Pooled Regressions
108 Firms, 784 Firm/Industry observations, Dependent Variable: ∆OSij
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
OS87 -0.192 -0.208 -0.266 -0.269
(-6.320) (-6.441) (-3.767) (-4.079)
SHACOMjs -0.038 -- -0.005 --
(-1.782) -- (-0.335) --
SHAVERTjs -- -0.036 -- -0.010
-- (-1.427) -- (-0.633)
GROWCOMjs 0.032 -- 0.026 --
(8.238) -- (8.319) --
GROWVERTjs -- 0.009 -- 0.010
-- (2.644) -- (2.920)
LEADER87 0.082 0.094 0.078 0.098
(4.698) (5.039) (4.499) (5.039)
ENTRY 0.111 0.133 0.081 0.095
(7.528) (7.861) (5.124) (5.366)
EXIT -0.162 -0.173 -0.100 -0.117
(-7.364) (-7.287) (-4.608) (-4.582)
SENSITIVE 0.018 0.018 0.003 0.002
(2.566) (2.392) (0.639) (0.335)
DIV87 0.001 -0.0003 -- --
(0.664) (-0.186) -- --
LFIRMSIZE87 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011
(-2.013) (-2.134) (-3.054) (-3.250)
SHACOM * OS87 -- -- -0.184 --
-- -- (-1.117) --
SHAVERT * OS87 -- -- -- -0.230
-- -- -- (-1.500)
GROWCOMjs * OS87 -- -- 0.043 --
-- -- (1.226) --
GROWVERTjs * OS87 -- -- -- -0.008
-- -- -- (-0.196)
LEADER87 * OS87 -- -- 0.072 0.041
-- -- (1.158) (0.685)
ENTRY * OS87 -- -- 0.430 0.514
-- -- (2.503) (2.402)
EXIT * OS87 -- -- -0.322 -0.314
-- -- (-2.356) (-1.896)
SENSITIVE * OS87 -- -- 0.099 0.115
-- -- (2.237) (2.625)
Constant 0.063 0.071 0.089 0.101
(2.430) (2.530) (3.451) (3.557)
Adjusted R-squared 0.296 0.238 0.351 0.299
Notes: Results corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 7
Determinants of Output-Share Change (1987-1997)
Pooled Regressions, 108 Firms, 676 Firm/Industry observations, Dependent
Variable: ∆OSij
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
OS87 -0.534 (-3.727) -0.722 (-4.305) -0.713 (-5.476) -0.711 (-5.497)
SHACOMjs -0.021 (-1.297) -- -- -- -- -- --
SHAVERTjs -- -- -0.013 (-0.778) -- -- -- --
SHA2D87-j -- -- -- -- 0.005 (0.480) 0.007 (0.667)
GROWCOMjs 0.011 (3.318) -- -- -- -- -- --
GROWVERTjs -- -- 0.012 (3.543) -- -- -- --
GROWTH2D-j -- -- -- -- 0.006 (1.573) 0.006 (1.515)
LEADER87 0.056 (2.831) 0.057 (2.324) 0.047 (1.993) 0.048 (2.040)
ENTRY 0.087 (5.364) 0.088 (5.240) 0.083 (4.930) 0.085 (5.097)
EXIT -0.082 (-4.092) -0.061 (-2.569) -0.058 (-2.358) -0.056 (-2.263)
SENSITIVE -0.002 (-0.357) -0.006 (-1.001) -0.007 (-1.103) -0.007 (-1.075)
C3jp 0.010 (1.070) -- -- 0.021 (1.953) -- --
V3jp -- -- 0.117 (1.802) -- -- 0.095 (1.256)
LFIRMSIZE87 -0.014 (-5.101) -0.016 (-4.894) -0.015 (-4.826) -0.016 (-4.897)
SHACOM * OS87 0.029 (0.084) -- -- -- -- -- --
SHAVERT * OS87 -- -- -0.142 (-0.373) -- -- -- --
SHA2D87-j * OS87 -- -- -- -- -0.108 (-0.653) -0.124 (-0.744)
GROWCOMjs * OS87 0.419 (4.735) -- -- -- -- -- --
GROWVERTjs * OS87 -- -- -0.071 (-1.390) -- -- -- --
GROWTH2D-j * OS87 -- -- -- -- 0.045 (0.547) 0.042 (0.515)
LEADER87 * OS87 0.275 (1.503) 0.563 (2.515) 0.606 (3.004) 0.605 (3.004)
ENTRY * OS87 0.300 (1.666) 0.781 (5.001) 0.850 (5.815) 0.840 (5.699)
EXIT * OS87 -0.148 (-0.867) -0.707 (-3.224) -0.664 (-3.074) -0.685 (-3.102)
SENSITIVE * OS87 0.210 (1.408) 0.408 (2.352) 0.422 (2.471) 0.435 (2.524)
Constant 0.132 (5.532) 0.147 (5.221) 0.138 (4.898) 0.147 (5.109)
Adjusted R-squared 0.481 0.359 0.356 0.354
Notes: Results corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-statistics in parentheses.
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